When attackers decide to password protect something, it can be very frustrating as an analyst, because we are often left with few options to find out what they are protecting. If this happens, we can always try to straight up brute force the password, but unless the attackers use something like 1q2w3e4r, we’re up a creek without an oar. If it’s an MD5 hash of a password, we have many more options to crack it. In the case of xls files, we have the option to essentially “wipe out” the password and give it our own password. In a recent wave of Dridex phishing emails, this is what we saw. Here’s the phishing email sent to one PhishMe employee: [Read more…]
Over the last few months, we’ve been tracking Dyre and reporting changes to the malware on this blog. Dyre’s latest iteration shows yet another shift in tactics – one that combines characteristics of Dyre with Upatre code to create a new downloader… Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 shows three different emails, all with the same content but with different malicious links, which we we’ll use interchangeably in our examples. [Read more…]
’Tis the season for phishing emails, scams, and fake tech support calls. We recently investigated such a call received by one of PhishMe’s employees. After saying that he would call the “technician” back, the employee passed the number over to us and we began to investigate.
The number the technician provided us was “646-568-7609.” A quick Google search of the number shows that other users have received similar calls from the same number. In one example, “Peter from Windows” was the person calling. In our case, it was Alex Jordan from Seattle. [Read more…]
With December upon us and 2014 almost in the books, it’s a perfect time to take a look back at the year that was, from a phishing standpoint of course. If you’ve been following this blog, you know that we are constantly analyzing phishing emails received and reported to us by PhishMe employees. What was the most interesting phishing trend we observed in 2014? While attackers are loading up their phishing emails with new malware all the time, the majority of their phishing emails use stale, recycled content. [Read more…]
Over the last few days, we have seen two waves of Dyre. The attackers have changed things up a bit and made it harder to analyze. By using memory forensics techniques, we took a peek into their command and control (C2) infrastructure. The #1 rule of memory forensics…everything has to eventually be decoded, and we’re going to use this to our advantage. Here’s a quick look at the waves of emails we received. (Figures 1 and 2)
On October 28th, several of our employees reported a wave of suspicious emails. The most peculiar of the bunch originated from an American university. Here is a screenshot of the phishing email:
Throughout life, there are several things that make me smile. Warm pumpkin pie, a well-placed nyan nyan cat, and most of all – running malware online – never fail to lift my mood. So imagine my surprise to see, after running a malware sample, that the attackers were watching me. Here’s a screenshot of a phishing email we received, which contained a keylogger written in .NET.
Post Updated 9/30/2014
Several months ago, the Internet was put to a halt when the Heartbleed vulnerability was disclosed. Webservers, devices, and essentially anything running SSL were affected; as a result, attackers were able to collect passwords, free of charge.
With Heartbleed, the exploit made a splash and many attackers started to use the vulnerability. One of the more high-profile attacks of Heartbleed was the CHS attack, where the attackers siphoned 4.5 million patient records by attacking a Juniper device, then hopping onto their VPN.
So how can something be bigger than Heartbleed? I’m glad you asked. [Read more…]